Dao Ye v. Atty Gen USA by unknown
2010 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
9-22-2010 
Dao Ye v. Atty Gen USA 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2010 
Recommended Citation 
"Dao Ye v. Atty Gen USA" (2010). 2010 Decisions. 566. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2010/566 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2010 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
1NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS







ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent
____________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A073-165-866)
Immigration Judge: Honorable Margaret Reichenberg
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 15, 2010
Before:  SCIRICA, SMITH AND WEIS, Circuit Judges





Dao Qing Ye seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”)
final order dismissing his appeal of the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of asylum,
withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).  We
2will deny the petition.
I.
Ye, a native and citizen of China, entered the United States in May 1992
without inspection.  In August 1993, he filed an application for asylum.  In support of the
application, Ye attached an addendum in which he stated that after his wife gave birth to
their second child in China, he was forcibly sterilized.
In August 1996, Ye was placed in removal proceedings after an Order to
Show Cause and Notice of Hearing (“OSC”) was filed, charging him with removability
pursuant to INA § 241(a)(1)(B).  At a January 1996 hearing, Ye, through counsel,
admitted the factual allegations in the OSC and conceded removability.  At that hearing,
Ye indicated that he wished to proceed under the asylum application that he filed in
August 1993, wherein he sought asylum and related relief.
At a hearing in April 1998, Ye withdrew his 1993 asylum application and
sought voluntary departure, which the IJ granted.  Ye remained in the United States,
however, and in January 2007 he filed a motion to reopen, seeking reconsideration of his
asylum application.  In the motion, Ye again submitted an affidavit claiming that he had
been forced to undergo “male sterilization” after his wife gave birth to their second child.
The IJ granted the motion to reopen after the Department of Homeland
Security (“DHS”) did not file an opposition.  In November 2007, Ye filed a second
application for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief, claiming that he suffered
3past persecution and has a well-founded fear of future persecution in connection with his
wife’s forcible sterilization and his own resistence to China’s coercive family planning
policy.  At a merits hearing, Ye testified that following the birth of the couple’s second
child, his wife was forcibly sterilized and they were fined.  In addition, Ye alleged that he
was briefly jailed, during which time he was beaten for failing to pay the fine.  Ye
believes he will be imprisoned upon his return to China for having failed to pay the
balance of the fine. 
The IJ denied Ye’s asylum application after determining that he lacked
credibility.  The IJ alternatively held that Ye failed to satisfy his burden of proof that he
had experienced past persecution for having violated the family planning policy.  With
regard to Ye’s credibility, the IJ determined that there were significant inconsistencies
between the information in Ye’s earlier administrative filings, namely his 1993 asylum
application and 2007 motion to reopen, and his 2007 asylum application and hearing
testimony.  Specifically, Ye alleged in his 2007 asylum application (and testified to the
same) that it was, in fact, his wife who had been forcibly sterilized following the birth of
the couple’s second child.  However, as mentioned, in Ye’s previous filings, he alleged
that he had been sterilized.
When questioned by the IJ about the inaccurate information in his previous
filings, Ye claimed that his first attorney had included the false information in his 1993
application unbeknownst to him and, because it had not been translated for him at the
4time, he was unaware of the error.  Ye did acknowledge, however, that in 1998 a friend
translated the 1993 application for him and he learned, for the first time, that it contained
inaccurate information.  Ye also acknowledged that he did not attempt to correct the
information at that time.  Instead, in his 2007 motion to reopen Ye again alleged that he
had been sterilized.  When asked during his administrative hearing why he repeated the
false claim, Ye stated that his 2007 motion to reopen had been prepared by a different
attorney who, at some point, handed his case off to a non-attorney.  Ye claimed that he
signed the motion without reading the contents because he believed that it represented his
true claim.  However, Ye later testified that while the motion was pending, he became
aware that the motion contained inaccurate information but opted not to amend it.
Ye filed a timely appeal with the BIA and, in an October 2009 decision, the
BIA affirmed both the IJ’s adverse credibility ruling and her alternative holding that Ye
failed to establish a claim of past persecution.  Following the BIA’s dismissal of his
appeal, Ye filed a timely petition for review in this Court.
II.
This Court has authority to review final orders of removal.  See 8 U.S.C. §
1252(a).  “[W]hen the BIA both adopts the findings of the IJ and discusses some of the
bases for the IJ’s decision, we have authority to review the decisions of both the IJ and
the BIA.”  Chen v. Ashcroft, 376 F. 3d 215, 222 (3d Cir. 2004).  We review agency
factual determinations for substantial evidence, and will uphold such determinations
      Although Ye argues that “the record is clear that [he] was not represented in his1
motion to reopen,” see Pet. Br. at 22, we agree with the Government that the record
suggests otherwise.  Counsel’s name appears on the motion to reopen, on the certificate of
service, and Ye testified that a lawyer prepared the document, but that he later returned to
China.  (See Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) at 451, 199).
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“unless the evidence not only supports a contrary conclusion, but compels it.”  Zhang v.
Gonzales, 405 F.3d 150, 155 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted).  We will disturb
the BIA’s adverse credibility determination only if “any reasonable adjudicator would be
compelled to conclude to the contrary.”  Lin v. Att’y Gen., 543 F.3d 114, 119 (3d Cir.
2008).  Because Ye filed his first asylum application prior to the effective date of the
REAL ID Act, the inconsistencies on which the BIA relied “must not be ‘minor’ and must
go to the heart of [his] claim.”  Id.
Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s adverse credibility determination. 
The BIA identified two deficiencies that it deemed collectively sufficient to supported the
IJ’s credibility ruling.  First, the BIA relied upon the inconsistencies between Ye’s 1993
asylum application and 2007 motion to reopen, and his subsequent asylum application and
hearing testimony.  The BIA noted that Ye knew of the false claim in his 1993 application
as early as 1998, yet proceeded to file a counseled motion to reopen repeating the same
inaccuracy.   As the IJ explained, even if the inaccuracy in Ye’s 1993 asylum application1
may be excused due to his inexperience with the immigration progress, his subsequent
filing could not be given the same benefit of the doubt.  The BIA further determined that
Ye’s proffered explanations for the discrepancies, including his lack of proficiency in
6English, were not valid, particularly because Ye was represented by counsel, at some
point, in both instances.
Second, the BIA relied upon the inconsistency between Ye’s hearing
testimony and his 2007 asylum application.  On cross-examination, Ye testified that
following his wife’s sterilization, police detained him for three days, during which time
he was handcuffed to a chair, slapped, and pushed, such that he required stitches. 
However, in his asylum application, he failed to indicate that he received any medical
treatment as a result of the alleged physical abuse.  Similarly, letters from Ye’s wife and
brother fail to describe any mistreatment that Ye suffered during the three-day detention.
Although Ye argues that the IJ and BIA failed to consider his “plausible
explanations” for his filing of false information in his motion to reopen, see Pet. Br. at 20,
the record does not support such a conclusion.  As mentioned, the BIA explicitly noted
that Ye’s “lack of English proficiency is not a valid explanation where [he] was
represented by counsel on both occasions.”  (J.A. at 3.)  We find no error in the decision
not to credit Ye’s explanations.  Although Ye claims that he was wholly unaware of the
contents of his previous filings, we do not find it plausible that Ye would not have made a
concerted effort to clarify the facts supporting his motion to reopen after having realized
in 1998, that his first asylum application contained the inaccurate claim that he had been
sterilized.
Ye also argues that his omission from his 2007 asylum application that he
7had been significantly harmed during his earlier detainment, should not have been used to
“impugn” his credibility.  See Pet. Br. at 23.  He cites several cases which support the
proposition that an alien need not provide every detail of his claim to be deemed credible. 
See, e.g., Senathirajah v. INS, 157 F.3d 210, 221 (3d Cir. 1998) (“Minor inconsistencies
in the record such as discrepancies in dates which reveal nothing about an asylum
applicant’s fear for his safety are not an adequate basis for an adverse credibility
finding.”); Secaida-Rosales v. INS, 331 F.3d 297, 308 (2d Cir. 2003) (explaining that
outright inconsistencies and omissions must be measured against the whole record before
they may justify an adverse credibility determination). 
However, in reviewing the omission in Ye’s case, the BIA appropriately
cited our decision in Xin Jie Xie v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 239, 243 (3d Cir. 2004), wherein
we held that the omission of a key event from an asylum application may support an
adverse credibility finding.  We note that Ye does not dispute the BIA’s finding that the
omission in his case is material.  Moreover, none of the cases that he cites suggests that
one may omit a material claim from an asylum application and still be deemed credible. 
Accordingly, we agree with the BIA that Ye’s omission is material, as it goes to the heart
of his claim of past persecution.
Even assuming that Ye was credible, the record does not compel the
conclusion that he established his persecution claim.  As an initial matter, we agree with
the BIA that, to the extent Ye relied on his wife’s experiences to support his asylum
       Ye indicated that a fine of 5000 RMB had been imposed, but that it had been2
partially paid by his brother.  Notably, although Ye argues that he will likely be jailed
upon his return to China for having failed to pay the outstanding balance, he admitted that
he has sent no money back to his wife and children to pay the fine despite having worked
in the United States since, at least, 2002.  Furthermore, Ye admitted that his family has
remained in China unharmed, despite the unpaid balance.
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claim, he is not eligible for relief.  See Lin-Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 557 F.3d 147, 157 (3d
Cir. 2009) (en banc).  However, spouses remain eligible for relief if they can establish
their own persecution for resisting China’s coercive reproductive policy or a
well-founded fear of future persecution for that resistance.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). 
We agree with the BIA that Ye is unable to make such a showing.
Ye argues that the cumulative impact of being fined, detained, beaten, and
having his property seized, rose to the level of persecution.  See Pet. Br. at 25-27. 
However, there is no indiction that the economic restriction imposed upon him was so
severe as to constitute persecution.   See Li v. Attorney General, 400 F.3d 157, 168 (3d2
Cir. 2005).  We also conclude that Ye’s three-day detention and the confiscation of some
of his personal property do not amount to persecution.  See Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329
F.3d 157, 168 (3d Cir. 2003) (Persecution includes “threats to life, confinement, torture,
and economic restrictions so severe that they constitute a real threat to life or freedom”
and  does not “include all treatment that our society regards as unfair, unjust, or even
unlawful or unconstitutional.”).  In sum, we agree with the BIA that Ye, who has the
burden of establishing his eligibility for asylum, see 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a), has not met that
9standard.
As Ye did not meet his burden of proof on his asylum claim, his claim for
withholding of removal necessarily fails.  See Yu v. Att’y Gen., 513 F.3d 346, 349 (3d
Cir. 2008).  We also conclude that the BIA did not err when it concluded that Ye had not
established a basis for relief under the CAT, as he did not demonstrate that it is more
likely than not that he would be tortured upon his return to China.
We will deny the petition for review.
